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8. Writing the ‘Great Proteus of Disease’: Influenza, Informatics, and the Body 
in the Late Nineteenth Century 
 
James Mussell 
 
When I began to draft this chapter, in April 2009, a computer worm called Conficker 
began to download information from the internet onto the machines that it had 
infected. Worms take advantage of information transfers to move between machines 
and are capable of replicating themselves from within the systems they infect. 
Although not harmful in themselves, they are often used to distribute malicious code 
that alters the performance of an infected machine.i As soon as Conficker began 
downloading, information spread over the micro-blogging site Twitter 
<http://twitter.com>. Various news sources around the world, both specialist 
technology sites and traditional news vendors such as the BBC, broke the news on 
Twitter, and their followers promptly reproduced this with short messages (‘tweets’) 
of their own. Within four days, however, discussion on Twitter was dominated by a 
different kind of virus, as news of the first death caused by an outbreak of swine ’flu 
was reported in Mexico. In each case, Twitter distributed news just as other bodies, 
those of computers and people, propagated viruses of their own. 
  In this chapter I argue that the influenza pandemics of the late nineteenth 
century were simultaneously biological and cultural phenomena. However, I do not 
mean that the impact of the biological virus caused a range of cultural effects or even 
that the diverse cultural effects of the virus prompted it to appear in a variety of 
material forms. Rather, because of its indeterminate material nature influenza was 
able to infect both the human and the social body simultaneously and move between 
both. News, computer worms, and biological viruses all exploit informational 
networks but none are purely information. Each has a material supplement, whether it 
is language, computer code, electrical signals or chemical compounds, that dictates 
how it moves information through culture. Just as the behaviour of Conficker and the 
messages on Twitter are determined by the way in which each is coded and executed, 
so the ontological status of biological viruses such as influenza limits their 
transmission and effect. You cannot catch the ’flu by reading about it and the 
possibility of a computer virus affecting biological systems remains a fantasy of 
science fiction.ii Yet information, essentially immaterial yet dependent upon material 
media and the systems that connect them, operates on and across the borders of 
minds, bodies and machines. Although conceptualized as independent of the media 
upon which it relies, information does not exist in the abstract, only as part of an 
object in some sort of system of communication.iii As information, by definition, is 
capable of transmission, of transcending its material manifestation, the extent to 
which the news, computer worms and biological viruses differ from being purely 
information is the extent to which they can be attributed bodies of their own. 
When influenza appeared in 1889 it was expected that it too would be 
attributed a body. Robert Koch’s announcement of the Tubercle bacillus in 1882 not 
only demonstrated that germs were the causative agents for disease but that it was 
also possible to isolate and identify them.iv Indeed, Koch’s four postulates, which still 
provide the criteria for establishing a causal link between a microbe and a disease, 
were predicated upon the idea that diseases are caused by discrete entities that could 
be isolated from and grown separately to diseased tissue.v Without a demonstrable 
causative agent for influenza, it was difficult to cohere the diverse symptoms with 
which it was associated to a single named condition and impossible to delimit its 
modes of transmission and contagion. Highly contagious but seldom fatal, and 
causing a range of symptoms that were identical to those of other conditions, 
influenza could pass between bodies and also enter into them. All viruses, whether 
electronic or biological, challenge the autonomy of individual bodies by 
foregrounding both their interconnectedness and their porousness: however, the 
indeterminate materiality of the late nineteenth-century influenza virus permitted it to 
exploit a range of media, whether human or nonhuman, and so infect biological and 
informational systems simultaneously. Although reading about the ’flu was not the 
same as having the ’flu, it appeared that it could be spread by communication 
networks as well as human contact. Like a computer virus, influenza utilized the 
networks that connected disparate bodies and exploited human activity to reproduce: 
however, as an infection of information, it was not restricted to electronic systems, 
but instead became as immaterial as information itself.  
 *  *  * 
 
The electronic communication of information, whether human-readable or machine-
readable, is considered to be one of the defining characteristics of the information age. 
The speed with which electronic networks function permit humans and machines 
distributed across the globe to interact almost instantly. This fantasy of proximity has 
been fostered by the development of web 2.0 technologies that not only make it easier 
to create content for distribution online, but also to liberate information from the 
applications with which it was created. Although the popularity of web 2.0 resources 
such as Flickr <www.flickr.com>, Facebook <www.facebook.com> and Twitter is 
due to the connections they facilitate between users, their power lies in the way they 
aggregate and order the information that users provide (often for free). By recording 
the behaviour of their users over time, such resources offer back an alienated, 
disembodied and fractured version of the self that differs from postmodern 
subjectivity in that it lacks any material repository. When allied with the more 
familiar effects of the information age – instant communication, electronic financial 
transactions, digitization, and digital simulacra – it seems that it is not just the 
signified that is deferred, but materiality itself.  
This has lead some to overdetermine the boundary between the dematerialized 
present and the material past. In his Living on Thin Air (1999), Charles Leadbeater set 
out the transformations that he believed were necessary for societies to thrive in the 
electronic age: 
 
We have to go forward because if we retreat we end up with gridlock. Our 
societies and governments often seem paralyzed, or at best enfeebled, in the 
face of economic and technological change that outstrips their capacity to 
respond. We are weighed down by institutions, laws and cultures largely 
inherited from the industrial nineteenth century; yet we confront a global 
economy driven by an accelerating flow of new ideas and technologies which 
are creating the industries and products of the twenty-first century. We have 
welfare systems which are impervious to reform, parliamentary systems which 
are recognizably Victorian and schools which still resemble their nineteenth-
century forebears. Imagine fighting a modern war using cavalry: that is the 
position we are in.vi   
 
The Victorian here stands for an industrialized past populated with things in contrast 
with a present confronted with the rapid electronic transfer of information. The 
association of materiality with history corresponds to a blinkered version of 
globalized culture that is blind to the production and circulation of commodities. The 
postindustrial West is presented as the location of (post)modernity, while the 
industrial activity that sustains it is pushed to the margins and associated with a less-
civilized past. 
The emphasis on the immateriality of information at the expense of the 
materiality of informatics also elides the mechanism through which the past 
influences the present. Existence through time is always predicated on the material. 
Our inheritance is always embodied, whether this is in terms of genetics or property, 
and the Victorian institutions that Leadbeater condemns as anachronistic survive 
precisely because they are structures that are intended to embody memory.vii What 
this material inheritance demonstrates, in diverse contexts ranging from spiritualism 
to science and aesthetics, is that the Victorians, although an industrialized society, 
were not only concerned with the immaterial, but also its relation to the material 
world.viii The resurgence of interest in nineteenth-century material culture has gone 
some way to restoring the role of objects in culture but often stresses their cultural 
meanings, particularly as commodities, at the expense of their material properties.ix 
The two, of course, are never wholly divorced as material form has semiotic potential 
but, as Bill Brown has noted, materiality, the ‘thingness of objects’, only becomes 
apparent when ‘they stop working for us’.x The edges of things both account for the 
integrity of objects, allowing them to exist in the world, and their resistance, as they 
are literally what return our touch. To become carriers of information, the edges of 
objects must be overcome so that they function as nodes in networks rather than 
things. Objects in informational networks thus transcend their boundaries in order to 
influence one another. In this way, information plays a part in defining the limits of 
objects and determining what meaning they have for us. Not only does information 
help determine the properties of its material media, but it also hints at other objects of 
which we might not be fully aware. 
The etymology of the word ‘virus’ captures its material ambiguity. Joost Van 
Loon argues that the ‘virus has always functioned as a label for that which cannot be 
named otherwise, a remainder of the known world, and a reminder of nature’s 
inherent unintelligibility’.xi The word ‘virus’ carries with it an imponderable 
supplementarity, similar to the way ‘thing’ describes that aspect of materiality that 
always lies beyond the human world.xii Derived from a Latin word meaning ‘slimy 
liquid’ – a definition that lived on in English as an obsolescent term for semen – the 
meanings of ‘virus’ prior to the emergence of its contemporary biological definition 
were all associated with poisonous discharges.xiii As harmful substances, viruses are 
conceived as being alien to the body, but their malicious influence, affecting the body 
from within, makes their boundaries difficult to establish. Just as Brown’s description 
of things foregrounds their liminal status, hovering ‘over the threshold between the 
nameable and unnameable, the figurable and unfigurable, the identifiable and 
unidentifiable’, so the virus both names something that can be transmitted but at the 
same time is yet to be defined.xiv The body’s immune system must identify viruses as 
other, marking them so that they can then be destroyed. This is usually understood in 
informational terms, with chemical signals establishing the boundaries between self 
and other within an otherwise self-contained system; but what is destroyed is, 
nonetheless, an object.xv The same process underpins the detection and destruction of 
computer viruses. Like biological viruses, they too are parasitic – pieces of alien code 
that insert themselves into an application so that they can be executed as part of the 
system’s legitimate processes – and virus protection software works by checking code 
against indices of either ‘healthy’ programs or known threats in order to establish 
what to destroy. As Stefan Helmreich argues, although protection against computer 
viruses is frequently understood in biological terms (my virus checker puts suspected 
viruses into quarantine), the extension of biological language to electronic systems 
exposes its ideological foundations. In an age of networked computing, it is not clear 
what constitutes the body that needs protecting: is it the workstation, the network, or 
the web as a whole? Although immunology might fall back on the integrity of the 
body, human bodies, of course, are also networked.xvi The immune system establishes 
the difference between self and other, but it does so from within the body, suggesting 
that not only are our bodies connected, but that they also overlap. Information – as 
language, pattern, or difference – might be the means in which bodies overcome their 
boundaries and influence one another, but it is also the means through which immune 
systems establish what those edges and so what those objects are. 
When the outbreak of influenza in St Petersburg was announced in The Times 
on 25 November 1889, its correspondent linked it to the sanitary conditions of the city 
and Russia as a whole.xvii However, by the 3 December the rapid distribution of 
influenza around the Russian Empire prompted predictions of its spread into the rest 
of Europe.xviii The previous documented outbreak in Britain had been in 1847 and the 
fullest account of the disease was Theophilus Thompson’s Annals of Influenza from 
1852, which provided a natural history of the disease from 1510 to 1837. Despite its 
high morbidity – early reports stated up to a third of the population of St Petersburg 
had been afflicted – the low number of deaths resulting from influenza reassured 
British commentators that its effects, should it spread, would not be serious. In fact, 
The Times suggested that ‘in the interests of science, its arrest in Russia would 
probably be a misfortune; for, if it should reach more scientific countries, it will 
certainly be subjected to a more searching examination than is otherwise at all 
probable’.xix The improved sanitary conditions that had prevented the spread of 
cholera from across the channel during the recent outbreak in France would also 
protect the population from the more severe effects of influenza. In addition, 
confidence in contemporary microbiology meant that the outbreak offered the 
opportunity to learn more about the germ that was suspected to be its cause. As The 
Times stated: 
 
To the scientific pathologist, indeed, the reappearance of a disease which has 
not visited this country for forty-two years would be a matter of the most lively 
interest calculated to excite in him emotions parallel to those with which a 
sportsman would engage in the pursuit of some previously unknown game, or 
an archaeologist, before mummies were vulgarized, in the task of unrolling 
one.xx 
 
Its reappearance offered the opportunity to transform the symptoms of influenza from 
occulting surface phenomena into demonstrable marks of presence. Like a spirit 
summoned for a séance, influenza would be made to perform subject to scientific 
scrutiny so that it could be allocated a place in the known material universe.   
Influenza reached Britain late in December 1889. It is difficult to give a 
precise date because it was not clear when influenza actually became manifest. The 
word was already in use to describe a range of catarrhal conditions and, particularly in 
winter, there were a range of drugs advertised that promised to cure it. However, once 
the severity of the outbreak in Russia began to be appreciated, publications began to 
take news of its spread from the news agencies and their own correspondents around 
Europe. Reuters, for instance, ran an ‘Influenza Special’ that supplied updates on the 
progress of the pandemic to the British press. London was one of the last capitals to 
experience influenza, so most people’s knowledge of the outbreak was limited to such 
reports. The Times was the first British paper to publish news of the outbreak in St 
Petersburg on the 25 November 1889 and it continued to print reports of influenza 
from Reuters and its own correspondents.xxi By the thirtieth it was reported to have 
spread around Russia;xxii by the 9 December it was in Berlinxxiii and Copenhagen,xxiv 
and by the 10 December Reuters reported it was also in Austro-Hungary.xxv By the 11 
December reports appeared confirming cases in Paris.xxvi On the 13 December The 
Times dismissed rumours that it had broken out in Chiswick, West London, as 
‘fictitious terrors’,xxvii but the following week reported outbreaks as far apart as 
Madrid,xxviii Belgrade,xxix Amsterdam and New York.xxx Readers in Britain, therefore, 
had five weeks to trace the progress of the pandemic from city to city, but did so with 
the creeping awareness that influenza travelled along the same routes and utilized the 
same technologies as the news they were reading.   
When influenza became imminent in London, the press found itself in its usual 
position of warning about the dangers of rumour while being responsible for peddling 
it.xxxi The Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, was one of the first British victims of the 
pandemic. Answering the question whether he actually had influenza, the Pall Mall 
Gazette, in its gossip column, ‘To-Day’s Tittle Tattle’ replied: 
 
That is the question on everyone’s lips for the next day or two. As nobody 
seems to know exactly what the influenza is, it must be still more difficult to say 
whether any particular patient has it or not; and there is thus a boundless field 
for speculation and gossip.xxxii 
 
Lori Loeb has shown how influenza challenged the authority of the medical 
profession.xxxiii Unable to pronounce definitively as to what influenza was and 
reduced to suggesting treatments that might ameliorate its symptoms rather than 
provide a cure, medicine could offer little more than the commercial market for 
drugs.xxxiv The press was well placed to benefit from this situation, able to sell news 
of the pandemic, disseminate medical advice, and advertise a wide range of drugs. 
The Pall Mall Gazette, for instance, used a ‘lady reporter’ to pose as a patient in order 
to obtain medical advice from four leading practitioners. Although the paper justified 
the publication of this advice on the basis that the public needed information, it 
scandalized the medical profession as it not only revealed that their prescriptions were 
all slightly different and generally confined to treating the symptoms rather than the 
germ itself, but also destroyed the market for their expertise by providing access for 
the price of a newspaper.xxxv The manufacturers of drugs, on the other hand, were well 
situated to capitalize on rumours of the approaching pandemic and soon began to 
tailor their advertisements accordingly. As drug manufacturers did not need to reveal 
their ingredients unless they contained an ingredient controlled by the 1870 Pharmacy 
Act, they encouraged the spread of information about both the disease and their drugs. 
On the 4 January 1890, for instance, shortly after the first cases were confirmed in 
London, an advertisement for Salt Regal in the Illustrated London News claimed, 
under a headline of ‘THE COMING EPIDEMIC! THE COMING EPIDEMIC!!’, that 
it was a ‘Preventive and Safeguard.xxxvi Salt Regal was advertised in a wide range of 
publications, including the Pall Mall Gazette, the liberal weekly Truth and the 
evangelical weekly Great Thoughts. At the peak of the pandemic, its manufacturers 
ran a subsequent advertisement that claimed the ‘users of SALT REGAL have 
hitherto escaped the EPIDEMIC’, reminding readers once more that ‘SALT REGAL 
[was] a Preventive and Safegaurd!!’ and offered a range of testimonies as 
evidence.xxxvii 
The rapid diffusion of information about influenza – whether news, gossip, 
commentary or advertisement – was difficult to separate from its spread through the 
bodies of those infected. Its high morbidity coupled with its low mortality meant that 
experience of the ’flu was widespread while very few people died from the condition. 
There were four waves of influenza between 1889 and 1894 (January-February 1890; 
April-May 1891; January-February 1892; December-January 1893-4) and it is 
estimated that a third of the adult population of England, Wales and Ireland suffered 
at least one attack over these years.xxxviii There were further outbreaks in 1895 and 
1899-1900, but all these late nineteenth-century occurrences of influenza tend to be 
overshadowed by the 1918 outbreak that was responsible for an estimated 20 million 
deaths worldwide.xxxix Unlike the 1918 outbreak, with its high rate of mortality, these 
earlier pandemics were characterized by a low mortality rate and most deaths were 
attributed to associated conditions such as pneumonia. For instance, during the first 
outbreak in 1889-1890, only 599 deaths were attributed directly to influenza in 
London, rising to a maximum of 2205 during the more severe outbreak in April-May 
1891. Even when the other deaths in which influenza was thought to have contributed 
are added, these totals only reach 2800 and 5800 respectively.xl In a city of around 5 
million of which up to 3 million caught the disease, the probability of dying from a 
bout of influenza was very low.xli Unlike cholera, which had a high mortality rate 
regardless of the age of those afflicted, influenza tended to be more dangerous for the 
elderly, the poor, or those susceptible to other respiratory diseases and so was not 
taken quite so seriously as a threat to public health. That said, the more lethal second 
wave did prompt some concern. In the Spectator, for instance, fears were expressed 
for public order as government was by the ‘comparatively old’ and, in Leisure Hour, 
Alfred Schofield reminded his readers that even though influenza had a low mortality 
rate (he cited 1%) its high morbidity meant that it had still killed more than cholera.xlii 
The overall consensus, however, was that influenza was something that simply had to 
be tolerated. 
Prior to the outbreak in Britain, the Lancet had noted that its rapid spread 
meant that it had ‘no geographical limitation, it is apparently uninfluenced by season 
or climate, and its virus travels over sea and land in a manner so baffling and 
contradictory to the ordinary conceptions of the transmission of infection as to render 
any simple explanation of its nature almost impossible’.xliii As the symptoms of 
influenza resembled so many other illnesses it was difficult to determine whether it 
was present in a population until it was sufficiently widespread and then, of course, it 
was too late to study its propagation. Equally, once influenza was mooted at a cause 
of illness within a population, there was concern that symptoms caused by other 
diseases would be misattributed to it. The only sign of its presence was its rapid 
communication. An attack of influenza typically lasted two to four days, with a period 
of recovery lasting another two weeks. As each wave of the pandemic lasted 
approximately four to six weeks, with the number of cases steeply declining towards 
the end of this period, the bulk of cases occurred simultaneously.xliv No biological 
organism, it was believed, could travel this fast and, despite various suggestions as to 
the transmission of either the germs of influenza or some sort of force to activate 
them, many accepted the outbreak as another manifestation of late nineteenth-century 
mass culture.xlv Influenza rapidly became known as the ‘fashionable epidemic’ and 
there were suspicions that some complaining of the influenza were either 
exaggerating the symptoms or faking them entirely.xlvi For instance, the Illustrated 
London News ran a full-page cartoon that depicted a number of people either taking 
advantage of the influenza to indulge or blaming it for the consequences of 
overindulgence (figure 1). Andrew Wilson, who contributed its science column 
entitled ‘Science Jottings’, grudgingly devoted his ‘Monthly Look Around’ to the 
raging pandemic on the basis that from ‘peer to peasant everyone appears to regard 
this topic as the only subject of interest’. Wilson, a lecturer on zoology and 
comparative anatomy at the Edinburgh Medical School, had little to tell his readers 
about the scientific underpinnings of the pandemic: 
 
The science of influenza is summed up by saying that doubtless it is a germ-
produced disease. Only on the theory that its germs were diffused far and wide 
can we account for its spread.xlvii   
 
Instead, he speculated that influenza has been ‘used as an excuse for the breaking of 
unwelcome engagements’ and that ‘the next comic song of the music-halls will be 
founded on the epidemic, with a chorus beginning “Have you got it?” or some equally 
asinine refrain’.xlviii Rather than give the microbiological context for the pandemic and 
ignoring the (false) announcement that the germ had been discovered in Vienna, 
Wilson instead attacked the medical professions concerns about self-doctoring, which 
he termed ‘old wifeism in medicine’.xlix  
It was to ‘The Ladies’ Column’ of the Illustrated London News that one turned 
to receive useful information about influenza and advice on how to treat it. In the 
same issue as Wilson’s remarks, Florence Fenwick Miller stated that influenza had 
‘proved not so trifling and half-imaginary a complaint as was at first hoped’ and then 
gave statistical information as to its effect on the death rate in London.l She claimed 
that Doctors had ‘always been clever at concealing their helplessness against disease 
under a cloud of imposing language’ before explaining the terms ‘microbe’ and 
‘bacillus’: 
It is a somewhat appalling idea that each human system forms a world, in which 
a whole myriad of microscopic animalculae are born, live by their own exertion, 
perhaps form kingdoms or republics, hoard wealth, prey on each other, rear 
offspring, and depart from life after what seems to them a prolonged existence 
unaware that the microcosm in which they have passed their span is not the 
universe! But though there is an awful poetry in this reflection, it does not help 
us to a knowledge of how to keep out, or how to exterminate after having let in, 
those microbes which are inimicable to the body’s wellbeing.li 
Miller’s evocation of the microbiological sublime emphasized the porousness of the 
body. For Miller, it was medicine’s responsibility to intercede into the subvisible 
realm and provide the immunological system that would protect the autonomy of the 
individual, but it was the responsibility of her readers (‘us housewives’) to ‘to tackle 
the difficulty, so to speak, form the opposite side, and take care that our patients are 
given all that they can take to maintain the general strength to fight against the 
deductions made from it by the microbe army’. Rather than target the microbe, Miller 
suggested nourishing the body, reasserting its outside, and so substituted effective 
nursing for ineffective doctoring.lii   
For Miller, the microbiological sublime offered a way of imagining the body 
in the world that did not depend on its visible limits, but she nevertheless argued that 
modernity, particularly information technology, had put these limits at risk. She 
imagined that ‘the enterprising microbe has travelled with speed, perhaps by train or 
by telegraph, to other parts of the kingdom’ and warned that ‘we must pay the price of 
our advantages, and the trains which carry us and our letters so rapidly about serve 
also, apparently, for the quick conveyance of the destructive microbes of disease’.liii 
What is interesting is that, despite her evocation of influenza as a microbe, it here 
travelled like information, like letters on trains or electrical signals over wires. In the 
body too, influenza seemed to move rapidly, affecting different parts simultaneously 
and preventing the symptoms from appearing as indexical marks that could delineate 
the hidden microbe. Sir Morrell McKenzie, one of the physicians caught by the Pall 
Mall Gazette’s undercover reporter, attempted to account for the action of influenza in 
the Fortnightly Review shortly after the second wave in 1891. He explained that 
‘influenza is the very Proteus of disease, a malady which assumes so many different 
forms that it seems to be not one, but all diseases’ epitome, and its symptomatology 
includes almost everything, from running at the nose to inflammation of the brain’. 
He insisted that the cause of the disease was ‘a living germ of some kind’ but, in order 
to account for its multiple effects, suggested that it had an ‘electric affinity for the 
nervous system’.liv Rather than attack parts of the body, influenza instead exploited 
the means through which they were connected. McKenzie compared the effect of a 
bout of influenza to an electrical storm, explaining that the ‘extraordinary disturbance 
in our telegraphic system sometimes caused by a thunderstorm is as nothing 
compared with the freaks played by the living conductors in the human body if 
anything throws the governing centres out of gear’.lv Affinity expressed a structural 
relationship as well as an attraction and the analogy between the nerves and telegraph 
was an old one. In suggesting that influenza might act upon the nerves, McKenzie 
tantalizingly hinted that it might also move through them. 
Neither the social body nor the human body provided the friction of 
materiality for influenza, and so it behaved like an informational flow rather than the 
microbe it was widely suspected to be. As signal, rather than thing, its effects 
signified its presence but could not bring the microbe itself into being. Its edges, in 
other words, eluded the various technologies that attempted to make it an object of 
discourse. Not only was it difficult to establish causal relationships between the 
effects of influenza and whatever caused it, but there was no ‘it’ for such indexical 
marks to point towards. Competing discourses attempted to provide contexts within 
which influenza could cohere, but the result was multiplication and ethereality rather 
than a material object articulated through chains of signification. N. Katherine Hayles 
distinguishes between embodiment and the body in order to account for the tendency 
to dematerialize the body in postmodern thought. For Hayles embodiment is 
‘contextual, enwebbed within specificities of place, time, physiology and culture that 
together comprise enactment’, whereas the body is the product of discourse, an 
idealized form that is ‘always normative relative to some set of criteria’.lvi In the case 
of the late nineteenth-century influenza pandemic, there were many embodied 
experiences of influenza but there was not a coherent, unified, bounded construction 
of the body that could provide the discursive terrain within which the microbe might 
substantiate itself. Not only did the virus move through and between human bodies, 
but it also seemed to move with the news, on trains, through the post or over the 
wires. Rather than simply manifest itself in the human body, its disparate effects 
situated influenza across a variety of discursive terrains simultaneously. For Hayles, 
the tendency to reduce the body to informational flows in postmodern thought – to 
become posthuman – is due to the neglect of the specific instantiations of 
embodiment. However, for influenza the reverse was true. As its symptoms were not 
confined to the recognized edges of human bodies and its spread not restricted to the 
recognized ways in which such bodies were connected, it could not materialize as an 
objective entity independent of its individual instantiations. Instead, it became like 
information, able to move through what appeared to be different bodies and so reveal 
the hitherto concealed connections between them.   
 
*  *  * 
 
A week before the conference that prompted this collection of essays there was a 
terrorist attack at Glasgow Airport. Two men drove into the airport terminal, crashing 
their vehicle and setting it on fire. In a news report that followed the incident, a 
newsreader for Channel 4 News, stood in front of footage of the still-burning car, 
explained that it remained a crime scene as it could provide forensic evidence despite 
the evident damage. In the same report, reference was made to hard disks and mobile 
phones that had been obtained from the suspects’ homes. These objects, we were told, 
continue to carry records of communications somewhere within them even though the 
data might have been deleted. To reinforce his point, the newsreader reminded his 
audience that during the investigation into the murders in Soham in 2002, police 
obtained a breakthrough when the accused was confronted by evidence that one of the 
victims sent a text message (SMS) from near his house. In all these cases information 
was not conceived as immaterial and transitory, passing through the media that it 
employed, but instead as something that left traces that could be recovered. Just as 
material media create noise, affecting the signal, so the signal affects the media, 
depositing its traces. 
Information is never encountered outside of objects and it is the objects that 
provide the discursive contexts within which information must be read. In terms of 
forensics, it is not only the task of the scientist to extract information, but the correct 
information, leaving the rest as part of the object. Reading, too, is a process which 
differentiates between the code that is to be deciphered and all the other meaningful 
aspects to a text. In each case an interpretive process decides what remains as part of 
the object and what should be liberated from it. Just as the immune system reacts to 
identify and objectify the thing that threatens it, so too do institutions, whether this is 
medical science, trying to define the microbial nature of influenza by restricting it to 
the body, or the State using forensic science to identify which of its citizens represent 
a threat to its security. Such institutions exist to establish limits to the agency of 
people and things, and they do so by attributing influences to discrete entities. 
Influenza, as various nineteenth-century commentators noted, is 
etymologically linked to the idea of influence. The Times, for instance, told its readers 
that word originated in Italy and was connected to older traditions that associated 
instances of the plague with the movements of astral bodies.lvii Late nineteenth-
century space was not empty but provided the medium through which things – and 
indeed people – could influence one another. The concept of the ether, and the 
electromagnetic principles for which it furnished an explanation, provided a 
mechanism for discrete objects to overcome their material edges and affect, through 
emissions, vibrations, and fields, other bodies around them. The various social fads 
and fashions, advertised and promoted in the press, that swept through the newly 
constituted middle-class masses, demonstrated how people could be enthralled by 
products as well as political or social movements.lviii The evangelical weekly Great 
Thoughts, for instance, reminded its readers that influence was not, in itself, good or 
bad, but was simply made more pronounced by modern technology. ‘There is far 
more intercourse and sympathy between men now than in the distant past’, the 
anonymous author warned, ‘whether we will or not, we are always affecting those 
around us, always transmitting good or evil’.lix Just as it was up to the individual to 
modulate their influence so as to benefit others, it was also for the individual to 
determine which influences should be accepted and which should be rejected. 
However, it was not always easy to distinguish between good and bad influences, or 
even to determine where the self ended and influence began. The same technologies 
that exposed the subject to influence also distributed subjectivity much in the same 
way as telepathy permitted contact between minds.lx Influences could be seductive 
and individuals were weak: the trial of Oscar Wilde testified to the virulent influences 
that underpinned decadent aesthetics, while also pruriently guarding against their 
further transmission.lxi Even within the self, subjectivity was understood as the 
performance of boundaries: for Freud consciousness was the result of the repression 
of influences; for Myers it was simply those influences of which we were aware. 
Harold Bloom, in his Anxiety of Influence, claimed that ‘Influence is Influenza 
– an astral disease. If influence were health, who could write a poem? Health is 
stasis’.lxii The unhealthiness of influence tells of its disregard for boundaries; yet, in 
acknowledging influences as other, as outside, or as belonging to a particular entity, 
we also identify the boundaries that they transgress. For instance, influence both 
challenges the idea of the subject as rational and self-determining while also, through 
the notion of repression, providing the mechanism for establishing its boundaries and 
its continuity. What is important to note is the reflexivity of this process: influences 
are only detectable at the point of contact between entities; one might influence the 
other, but it is the other’s resistance that defines its contours. Objectifying something 
establishes its edges, but this applies to whatever is doing the objectifying as well. 
The various effects of influenza, distributed across and between disparate 
discursive bodies, could not function as signs in an economy of presence and 
absence.lxiii They indicated that influenza was present, but could not reify this 
presence into an object with edges of its own. Although the dominant explanation for 
its effects was some sort of microbe, the experience of witnessing its spread made it 
appear like an early computer virus, infecting informational systems so that they 
spread it further. Computers are vulnerable to viruses as they run executable 
programs, often delivered over networks. However, these programs are not pure 
information but are encoded electronic signals and, to defend against them, software 
discriminates between those influences that are permitted and those that must be 
excluded. As the late nineteenth-century influenza manifested itself in diffuse and 
often exclusive discursive terrains, it was difficult to delimit the edges of its influence 
or restrict it to a particular material environment. The use of the term ‘viral’ to 
describe the transmission of something through culture is a relatively recent addition 
to the OED, first appearing in 1989 with reference to viral marketing (OED). The 
nineteenth-century influenza pandemic demonstrates that what makes viruses viral is 
their indeterminable materiality. By failing to delimit its influences and so reify its 
cause, the ’flu was able to exploit its interfaces within and between bodies in order to 
mutate from a thing to a message and pass virulently through culture. 
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